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ABSTRACT 
Prior research has shown that environmental policy can create scarcity rents. We analyse 
this phenomenon in the framework of a duopoly that faces a carbon price, considering both 
Cournot and Stackelberg competition. We identify the different sources of scarcity rents, 
which we classify in “output” and “grandfathering” scarcity rents. The former depend on 
the elasticity of the rivals' output to the carbon price while the latter is exogenous. We also 
determine under which conditions these rents can be large enough to increase firms’ profits 
and, as a policy implication, to what extent the existence of scarcity rents can make the firms 
agree on a tougher policy. This event is more likely to happen under Cournot than under 
Stackelberg competition, and the chances increase if the firms are allowed to pollute a large 
amount without paying a price. 
 
JEL code: D43, L13, Q58 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the creation of scarcity rents for oligopolistic firms due to the 
existence of a carbon price. We model the mechanisms that give rise to scarcity rents and 
identify the circumstances under which such rents can be large enough to offset the costs to 
comply with a tougher environmental policy. 
Climate change is probably the most salient transboundary environmental problem. 
It was a reason behind the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in 1992 and its relevance within the policy agenda has been steadily increasing. 
Among economists, the most popular approach to deal with climate change is to set 
a carbon price by either introducing carbon taxes or by creating carbon markets (see, e.g. 
Tietenberg (2010) or Elkins and Baker (2001) for an overview of both policy approaches 
and some examples of their practical application). As noted by Convery (2009), the 
European Union (EU) initially planned to create a carbon tax, but the failure of this project 
gave rise to the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which is now a major 
pillar of the EU climate policy. 
It is well established in the literature that some environmental policies can create 
scarcity rents for firms, which in the case of climate policies are sometimes known as 
climate rents. This effect can arise with carbon taxes, but is perhaps more clearly visible in 
emission trading, as some firms can obtain additional revenue by selling permits. Empirical 
evidence suggests that this phenomenon has been rather important in the first phase of the 
EU ETS. A less obvious effect comes through the output market. A higher carbon price 
represents a higher cost for firms, which will react by producing less output and increasing 
prices. This induced effect can alleviate or even more than fully compensate the compliance 
costs, resulting in higher profits. 
We focus on two components of climate policy and their impact on climate rents: 
first, a marginal effect, which is the carbon price itself. In the case of a permit trading 
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system, this refers to the permit price prevailing in the market. In the case of an emission 
tax, it is the tax rate. The second element is a fixed-term effect, which measures the amount 
of carbon that firms can emit without paying a price. In the case of a cap-and-trade system, 
this takes the form of a certain number of free permits distributed among the firms by means 
of grandfathering. In the case of a tax, it refers to a tax exemption. For simplicity we will 
always refer to this effect as “grandfathering”. 
We set up a duopoly model in which each firm has to pay a carbon price for (a part 
of) its emissions. In the output market we allow for Cournot or Stackelberg competition. 
We show that a higher carbon price increases the firms’ cost of complying with the policy, 
but it also has two positive effects on profits. First, it restricts output and increases the output 
price as well as firms' revenues, which we call "output scarcity rent". The share of this type 
of rents that accrues to a specific firm depends on the elasticity of its rival's output with 
respect to the carbon price, which implies that a monopoly can never obtain output scarcity 
rents as we define them. The second positive effect is labelled “grandfathering scarcity 
rents” and is due to the fact that a higher carbon price increases the market value of the 
amount of emissions that are exempt. 
We explore a particular case with a separable cost function and linear demand to 
gain some further insights. As the first core finding we conclude that both firms face a profit 
function that is convex in the carbon price, which implies that, when the price is sufficiently 
low, both firms will benefit from a price reduction, whereas with sufficiently high prices, 
they will benefit from further increases. Apart from these two regions, in the Stackelberg 
model there is an intermediate interval in which both firms' interests are decoupled because 
the leader's profit is decreasing while the follower's is increasing. 
 
As a policy application of our results, we ask how likely it is that the firms are willing 
to accept a tougher climate policy. This is a relevant question from a political economy point 
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of view as any policy is more prone to be successful if the firms that will be affected are 
willing to accept it. We conclude that firms are more likely to agree on a tougher policy 
when they compete on an equal footing, as in the Cournot setting, whereas the existence of 
leaders and followers tends to create a wedge between the interests of both firms. 
Grandfathering makes the firms more likely to benefit from an increase in the carbon 
price. If grandfathering is large enough, the firms may be willing to accept a tougher policy, 
whatever the starting point. In the Stackelberg case there is a qualitatively stronger 
implication that leads us to conclude that, in the absence of grandfathering, the firms would 
never agree on a tougher policy as the agreement region shrinks to such an extent that it 
may disappear. Therefore, in a Stackelberg setting, the existence of grandfathering seems 
crucial for policy acceptability. 
As a sensitivity analysis, we allow for parameter asymmetries. In the Stackelberg 
case, we conclude that the willingness to accept a tougher policy is sensitive to the amount 
of the leader’s (but not the follower’s) emissions that are exempt. Moreover, those parameter 
changes that tend to undermine the leader’s advantage in the output market (an increase in 
the leader’s output cost or a decrease in the follower’s) make the firms more symmetric in 
a certain sense and increase the likelihood of agreement. The opposite occurs with 
abatement costs: the likelihood of agreement tends to decrease with the leader’s abatement 
cost and increase with the follower’s. 
The closest papers to ours are those dealing, on the one hand, with scarcity rents and 
the impact of carbon prices on firms’ profits and, on the other hand, with carbon markets 
and market power. For a broad discussion on scarcity rents, see e.g. Fullerton and Metcalf 
(2001). In a perfect competition framework, Mohr and Saha (2008) claim that, via the 
generation of scarcity rents, a stricter environmental regulation might increase firms’ profits 
and pass the cost onto consumers. André et al. (2009) make a similar point in a strategic 
setting with quality competition. MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2012) claim that both revenue-
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raising instruments, e.g. emission taxes or auctioned permits, and non-revenue-raising 
instruments, such as freely allocated tradable permits, can create scarcity rents that may be 
susceptible to costly appropriation activities. Kalkuhl and Brecha (2013) find that reducing 
fossil resource use could increase scarcity rents and benefit fossil resource owners under a 
permit grandfathering rule. Newell et al. (2013) report that the power generators extracted 
rents by receiving carbon allowances for free and then passing on the opportunity costs of 
these allowances to their customers. Moreover, some firms have taken the opportunity to 
sell a part of their permit allocation and get extra revenue. For an analysis of this 
phenomenon, see e.g. Sijm et al. (2006) or Ellerman et al. (2010). 
Several authors have addressed the existence of market power in the carbon markets 
and/or in the associated product markets. Hahn (1984) was the first to note that, with a 
dominant firm in the emission market, the resulting equilibrium is not cost-effective in 
general, and the efficiency loss depends on the initial allocation. Other studies have explored 
the consequences of market power in the emissions market under different settings. For a 
survey see Montero (2009). 
Other authors have shown that perfect competition in the carbon market might not 
be sufficient to render a cost-effective outcome if the product market is not perfectly 
competitive. In a Cournot duopoly, Sartzetakis (1997) shows that (competitive) emission 
trading modifies the allocation of emissions among firms and hence their production 
choices. Sartzetakis (2004) shows that welfare can decrease when emission trading is 
allowed between asymmetric firms endowed with different technologies. Meunier (2011) 
concludes that even if the firms are price takers in the emission market, the integration of 
such markets can decrease welfare because of imperfect competition in product markets. 
There are also some papers that consider market power in both permit and output markets. 
See, e.g. Misiolek and Elder (1989), Eshel (2005) Hinterman (2011, 2015) or De Feo et al. 
(2013). 
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This paper considers market power in the product market, but not in the carbon 
market. The reason is threefold. First, as noted by Montero (2009), while market power is 
very common in output markets, the existence of market power in carbon markets is more 
likely to appear when the relevant players are countries rather than firms. In the latter case, 
there are normally a very large number of participants, which makes it difficult for market 
power to arise. It can be argued that this is the case in the EU ETS, with more than 11,000 
facilities involved. Moreover, the latest steps taken by the European Commission seem to 
be aimed at increasing the degree of competition even more (by increasing the number of 
involved sectors, centralising the allocation of permits and moving from grandfathering to 
auctioning). On the other hand, among the economic sectors that are subject to the EU ETS, 
it is realistic to assume that at least in some of them there is some market power (see, e.g. 
Smale et al. 2006 or Hinterman 2011). 
Second, the EU ETS price shock in 2005 generated a great deal of interest in market 
power. Initially, the price of allowances was far in excess of expectations, but it suddenly 
fell in April 2006, reaching zero in mid-2007. Empirical studies have not been able to 
sufficiently explain these excessively high price levels when the number of permits 
exceeded emissions in every year of the first phase (see, e.g. Ellerman et al. 2010). It is 
therefore natural to ask whether the reason for these price variations might be linked to the 
output market rather than the permit market insofar as permits could somehow be used to 
obtain windfall profits in the output market. 
And third, we are interested in modelling how an increase in the carbon price impacts 
on the firms’ profits rather than explaining the origin of this increase. Our central 
conclusions do not crucially depend on the carbon price being determined by a tax or a 
permit trading system, as far as such a price is taken as exogenous. Therefore, we do not 
model the carbon market itself, but simply take the carbon price as a given indicator of the 
policy stringency. 
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A somewhat related paper is Ehrhart et al. (2008), which show that under some 
conditions firms can benefit from a higher price of permits. In contrast to their analysis, we 
consider grandfathering, which allows us to make an explicit characterisation of the 
different sources of scarcity rents. Moreover, we compare Cournot vs. Stackelberg settings, 
while Ehrhart et al. restrict themselves to situations in which the firms play exactly the same 
role in the market. We are not aware of any paper in the related literature that compares 
Cournot and Stackelberg settings. Another difference is our detailed study of a particular 
case, which renders some insights that cannot be derived in a general model. 
Section 2 presents the basic model. A particular abatement cost function is 
considered in Section 3. Section 4 investigates the possibility that firms can agree on a 
tougher policy. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are gathered in an appendix. 
 
2. The general model 
Consider a duopolistic polluting industry that faces an exogenous carbon price, p . 
To fix ideas, we consider that such a price is determined within a permit trading system, 
although most of our discussion is also valid for a tax.1 
The cost function of firm   1,  2i  ,  ,i i iC x e , depends on output ( ix ) and 
emissions ( ie ) and is continuous and twice differentiable in both arguments with the 
following properties: 
2 2
20 ,     0 ,     0 ,     0.i i i i
i i i i i
C C C C
x e e x e
               (1) 
                                                 
1 Provided that the carbon price is exogenous, a carbon market and a tax are basically equivalent for any firm 
that pollutes above its initial allocation. The main difference is that, in a market, a firm that pollutes below its 
permit allocation can sell permits and raise some revenue. This possibility can be replicated if the tax is 
combined with a subsidy for those firms that pollute below the exempt amount. See Goulder and Schein (2013) 
for a discussion on the relationship between permit trading and carbon taxes. 
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 This function integrates production and abatement costs and reflects the fact that 
producing clean is more costly than producing dirty. There is a carbon price p  that the firms 
take as exogenous,2 so that each firm i  has to pay p  monetary units for each unit of 
emissions except for the first iS , which is an amount of free permits received by means of 
grandfathering.3 Total cost is then given by 
     , : ,i i i i i i i iTC x e C x e p e S   .    (2) 
 We assume the following timing. In the first stage, the firms compete in the output 
market by choosing their output levels, 1x  and 2x , facing the inverse demand function 
 P X , where 1 2:X x x   , 0dpdX  . In the Cournot version the output decisions are 
simultaneous. In the Stackelberg case this first stage has two sub-stages: first the leader 
decides 1x  and then the follower sets 2x . In the second stage, both firms simultaneously 
choose their emission levels, ie  ( 1,2i  ) to minimize their total cost,  ,i i iTC x e , while 
taking their output levels and the carbon price as given. 
To find a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the model backwards. In the 
final stage, if the solution is interior, the first-order conditions (FOC) are 
0, 1,2,i
i
C p i
e
          (3)  
which implicitly defines each firm’s optimal amount of emissions,  * ,i ie x p .4 Using this 
expression in (2) we obtain the minimized total cost function in terms of output and the 
carbon price: 
         * * * *, : , , , , ,
i i i i i i i i i i i
TC x p TC x e x p C x e x p p e x p S        (4)  
                                                 
2 To interpret why the firms take the carbon price as exogenous, consider that this price is determined in a 
wider market in which other firms from different industries take part (as is the case, e.g. in the EU ETS). 
3 Under a carbon tax iS  can be seen as a tax exemption. 
4 The second order condition is always fulfilled due to the convexity of Ci in emissions. Throughout the paper, 
we restrict the analysis to interior solutions. Asterisks denote equilibrium values. 
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and using the envelope theorem we get 
*
*  
i
i i
TC
e S
p
,     (5) 
which simply states that the marginal impact of the carbon price on total cost equals the 
amount of emissions that are not exempt. 
Now we move on to the first stage of the game, the output market. Each firm 
maximizes its profit, defined as 
    
i
*
i i iP x TC x , p . 
We address Cournot and Stackelberg competition separately in the following 
subsections. 
2.1 Cournot 
Consider first that both firms decide their output levels simultaneously taking the 
rival's output as given. Firm i's FOC is 
  0ii i i
i
TCPP x x x
X x
     ,      (6) 
where “ i ” refers to the other firm. This equation implicitly defines the reaction function 
of firm i : 
 , Ri i ix x x p .      (7) 
 Using the implicit function theorem, we conclude that one firm´s output is 
decreasing in its rival´s output and the carbon price: 
2
2 2
2 2
0 ,    0
2 2
iR R
i i
i ii
i i
TCdPx x x pdX
TC TCx pdP dP
dX dXx x

          
,   (8) 
 10
where the second order condition requires that the denominator of both expressions is 
negative.5 
The system of equations formed by both reaction functions determine the final 
equilibrium as a function of the carbon price, p , and using the equilibrium value of output 
we can also write both agents´ profits as a function of p : 
     * * * * * *: ,i i i i i ip P x x x TC x e    .     (9) 
 Our main research question is to what extent, and by which channels, a higher carbon 
price can benefit firms.6 Differentiating (9) with respect to p and using equations (4) and (6) 
we obtain 

* *
* *
G
i
x
i
i i
i i i
SR
SR
d xdPS x e
p X p
     
,     (10) 
from which we conclude that the marginal effect of the carbon price on profits can be  split 
in three components. The two first effects ( xSR  and GSR ) are positive and account for the 
scarcity rents for firm i . The third component is negative and determines what part of the 
scarcity rents each firm can capture. 
The first component, which we label “grandfathering scarcity rent”, is exogenous 
and simply equals the amount of emissions that are exempt from paying the carbon price. 
The second term is endogenous and represents the additional revenue that each firm will 
receive thanks to the reduction in output supply and the resulting increase in the output 
price. We call it “output scarcity rent”. 
 Note that a higher value of p  causes the output of both firms, and hence total output, 
to decrease, which pushes the price up, but each firm can benefit only from the part of this 
                                                 
5 A sufficient (not necessary) condition for the second order conditions to hold is that *iTC  is convex in output. 
6 It is important to note that our results are marginal, not discrete, in the sense that we only consider increases 
in the carbon price. So, throughout the whole paper, we are considering that a policy that is already in place 
gets tougher, not that a new policy is introduced. 
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effect that is due to its rival’s output reduction, * ix p . The reason is that reducing your 
own output has both a positive effect (by increasing the price and decreasing the cost) and 
a negative effect (decreasing the number of sold units) and in equilibrium both effects cancel 
out each other because of the first order maximum profit conditions. The reduction in the 
rival’s production, on the contrary, causes output price to rise without having any negative 
side-effect for firm i . A consequence of this result is that a monopoly would never obtain 
positive output scarcity rents because of an increase in the carbon price. The only channel 
by which a monopoly could benefit from a higher p  is the grandfathering scarcity rent, and 
only if *i iS e , i.e., if it is a net seller of permits. 
From (10) we immediately obtain * *2 11 2 , ,x x x p x pSR SR     , where ,A B  denotes the 
elasticity of A  with respect to B , i.e., a firm enjoys more output scarcity rents than its rival 
if its rival’s output is more sensitive to the carbon price than its own output. 
The last term in (10) is the equilibrium amount of emissions or, equivalently, the 
required permits, which determine the part of the scarcity rents that firm i  is not able to 
capture. Who gets that part of the rents depends on how the firm obtains the permits. If they 
are auctioned, it is the auctioneer (typically the environmental authority) who gets the rents 
(and this is also the case under a tax). If the permits are bought in the secondary market, the 
rents are transferred to the seller. 
Altogether, the first and third summands in (10) represent the net purchase (if *i iS e
) or sell ( *i iS e ) of permits by firm i . If *i iS e , firm i  initially receives more permits 
than needed and it would get an extra profit by selling some permits, which can be naturally 
interpreted as a scarcity rent since the firm is getting some revenue by selling a scarce asset. 
If  *i iS e  the firm is a net buyer of permits, but we continue to interpret iS  as a scarcity 
rent in the sense that it allows the firm to finance for free part of the external cost caused by 
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its own emissions. In the limiting case, *i iS e , all the equilibrium emissions are exactly 
covered with free permits. Then, an increase in the carbon price would not have any effect 
on the firm’s cost and the final effect is simply the output scarcity rent.  
 If *i iS e  we know for sure that firm i  would benefit from an increase in p , i.e., 
the scarcity rents would be large enough to overcompensate the additional cost. On the other 
hand, if *i iS e , in general we cannot tell which effect prevails at this level of generality. 
Anyway, since the final effect is strictly positive when *i ie S , by continuity we can assert 
that there is some interval of iS  such that firm i 's profit increases with p  even if the firm 
is a net buyer of permits (or has to pay a tax for some of its emissions). Recall that this event 
is discarded in monopoly as the output scarcity rent is absent. Note that this result is 
consistent with the main result in Hintermann (2011), according to which the threshold of 
free allocation beyond which the firm profits from a carbon price increase is below full 
allocation.7 
 
2.2 Stackelberg 
Consider now that there is a leader (firm 1) and a follower (firm 2) in the output 
market. The aim is to find out how different positions in the market determine the ability of 
a firm to capture scarcity rents. The follower’s FOC is 
*
2
2
2
0TCdPP x
dX x
   ,     (11) 
                                                 
7 Note, anyway, that there is not a complete equivalence with Hintermann´s result as in their model there is a 
firm that enjoys market power both in the output and the permit market. 
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which implicitly gives the reaction function  2 1Rx x , p . Differentiating (11) and rearranging, 
we conclude that the follower’s output is decreasing in the leader’s output and the carbon 
price:8 
2
2 *
21
2
2
0
2
R
dP
x dX
TCdPx
dX x
    
,  
2 *
2
2 2
2 *
2
2
2
0
2
R
TC
x x p
TCdPp
dX x

     
.   (12) 
The leader’s FOC is 
  2 11 2 1
1 1
1 0
Rx TCdPP x x x
dX x x
         
,     (13) 
which implicitly determines the leader’s optimal output as a function of the carbon price, 
 *1x p . By differentiating (13), we conclude that the leader’s output supply is also 
decreasing in p : 
1
1
2 *
*
1 1
2 *
2
2
1 1
0
2
R
TC
dx x p
TCdp xdP
dX x x

       
.      (14) 
 Equations (12) and (14) show how the leader and the follower react to a carbon price 
increase. While the follower only takes into account the effect of its own output on the 
output price, the leader incorporates, not only its own, but also the follower’s. This tends to 
make the denominator of (14) smaller in absolute value and, hence, the whole expression 
greater in absolute value, i.e., the leader’s output tend to be more sensitive to the carbon 
price than the follower’s. 
Using the equilibrium output values we can express the profit of both firms solely 
as a function of the carbon price. Using the envelope theorem we obtain 
                                                 
8 The denominator of both ratios is negative if the second order conditions hold. The same applies to the 
denominator of (14) in the case of the leader. 
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1
1
1
*
* *2
1 1 1
G
x
R
SR
SR
d xdPS x e
dp dX p
   
,       (15) 
2
2
2
* *
* *1
2 2 2
G
x
SR
SR
d dxdPS x e
dp dX dp
   

,       (16) 
where we see the same qualitative effects as in the Cournot model: two components of the 
scarcity rents, SSR  and xSR , and the marginal cost effect, and the resulting sign is 
undetermined. Note that the effect of a price increase on the follower’s output has two 
components: a direct one and an indirect one through the leader’s output. Formally, 
* *
2 2 2 1
1
R Rdx x x dx
dp p x dp
    . Nevertheless, the latter effect is already accounted for in the leader’s 
optimising process and hence only the former matters to determine the leader’s scarcity rent. 
Direct comparison of (15) and (16) shows that *2 11 2 , ,Rx x x p x pSR SR     , i.e. the 
relative size of the output scarcity rent depends again on the elasticities, but what matters 
for the leader is the elasticity of its equilibrium output, while for the follower it is the 
elasticity of its reaction function. The rest of the discussion presented in the Cournot case 
basically applies to the Stackelberg model. 
The main conclusion that we can draw from (15) and (16) is that, unlike the Cournot 
case, the conditions under which a price increase is profit-enhancing are different for both 
firms. The reason is that their reactions to a price increase, given in (12) and (14), are 
different and, therefore, it may be the case that an increase in the carbon price causes the 
profit of one firm to increase and the other to decrease. To gain more accurate insights, we 
explore a specific case in the next section. 
 
3. A Separable Function   
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3.1. Basic elements 
Assume that production and abatement costs are separable in the following way. The 
production cost of firm i  is given by icx , where c  is a constant marginal cost. Each unit of 
output generates r  units of pollution, where 0r   is a constant coefficient of pollution 
intensity (the gross emissions of firm i  are given by irx ). By undertaking abatement 
activities, firms can reduce their flow of pollution. Let us denote as 0iq   the amount of 
emissions abated by firm i . Thus, net emissions are given by i i ie rx q  . Following 
Sartzetakis (1997), we assume the following quadratic abatement cost function ( AC ), 
which is common to both firms: 
   i i iAC q q d tq  ,  , 0.d t       (17) 
The inverse output demand function is linear:  P X a bX  . Assume that both 
firms initially receive an equal allocation of free permits (or a tax exemption), 1 2S S S  , 
and denote as iy  the amount of permits that firm i  buys (if 0iy  ) or sells (if 0iy  ) in 
the market, which is given by 
i i i iy e S rx q S     .      (18) 
In other words, i ie y S  , i.e., net emissions must be covered by permits that either 
come from the free allocation or are bought in the market. Firm i ’s total cost function can 
be written as 
        ,i i i i i i i i iTC x e cx rx e d t rx e p e S       .    (19) 
Solving the third stage of the game, we get optimal emissions: 
 * , 2i i i
p de x p rx
t
  , 1,2,i      (20) 
and abatement is 
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        * 2i
p dq p
t
 ,       1,2,i      (21) 
which, due to separability and cost symmetry, is independent of output and common for 
both firms. Using (20) in (18) and (19) we obtain the optimal traded permits and the 
corresponding minimized cost function: 
 * , 2i i i
d py x p rx S
t
   ,      (22) 
     
2
* , 4i i i
p d
TC x p x c pr pS
t
    ,     (23) 
and (23) reveals that the marginal production cost is constant in output and increasing in the 
carbon price. The market value of S  plays the role of a lump-sum cost reduction. Now we 
move on to the output stage. 
 
3.2 Cournot 
To ensure interior solution (with output, emissions and abatement being non-
negative), we introduce the following assumption. 
Assumption 1. The price of permits is bounded in the following way: Cd p p   where 
 
2
2 3
2 3
C tr a c bdp :
tr b
   . 
The lower bound for p  prevents abatement from being negative (see (21)). Note 
that d  is the marginal cost of abatement at 0q  . If the carbon price is lower than the cost 
of the first unit of abatement, it is never profitable to abate, since buying permits (or paying 
the tax) is a cheaper option. The upper bound prevents emissions from being negative, which 
implies that output is also positive.9 
From the FOCs we get the equilibrium output: 
                                                 
9 If net emissions and abatement are nonnegative, gross emissions must also be nonnegative, i.e. 0irx  , 
which implies 0ix  . 
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* *
3i i
a c rpx x
b
   .        (24) 
 The equilibrium profits are also constant across firms and given by 
   * * * * *2 ,i i i i ia bx x TC x p    . By differentiation, we get the particular version of (10): 
 
  
*
*
*
3 2G
i
x
i i
i
i
i i
SR
SR q
p r p dS x rx
p t
e
          
.     (25) 
The first term in (25) is the grandfathering scarcity rent, the second is the output 
scarcity rent and the third (the whole parenthesis) is the cost effect, which equals net 
emissions. We can get some useful intuitions by simple inspection of (25). 
First, by making S  large enough, it's always possible to make a firm willing to bear 
a higher carbon price thanks to the grandfathering scarcity rent, as any firm would benefit 
by holding a large amount of an asset that is becoming scarcer (and thus more expensive) 
in the market. 
Now drop the grandfathering effect by setting 0S   in (25) (i.e., permits are sold in 
an auction instead of grandfathering or there is no tax exemption). There are still two 
positive effects, the combination of which may cause the firm to benefit from an increase in 
the carbon price. The first is the output scarcity rent and the second is the firm’s ability to 
react by means of abatement (the second term in the parenthesis). If there was not an 
available abatement technology or it was prohibitively expensive,10 then the right-hand side 
of (25) would collapse to  2 3 ir x , whose sign is unambiguously negative. The economic 
consequence of this result is that the output scarcity rent by itself would never be enough to 
fully compensate the cost effect of a higher carbon price.11 
                                                 
10 This can be seen by making t  arbitrarily large in (25). 
11 This conclusion is sensitive to the linear demand assumption. See the “conclusions and discussion” section. 
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We can use the equilibrium values of output and emissions to write profit in terms 
of the carbon price: 
     
2 2
*
9 4i
a c pr p d
p pS
b t
      .    (26) 
The main features of this function and their economic consequences are summarised 
in Proposition 1: 
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1,  *i p  is a strictly convex function of p  with a global 
minimum at    24 9 2ˆ : 4 9C
tr a c b d tS
p
tr b
    , where ˆ
C Cd p p  . Therefore,  *i p  is 
decreasing for ˆ Cp p  and increasing for ˆ Cp p .  
According to Proposition 1, the profit function is U-shaped and there is a critical 
value of the carbon price, ˆ Cp , below which the negative effect dominates, i.e., an increase 
of the carbon price will reduce the firms’ profit, whereas above it further increments of the 
price will generate more than enough scarcity rents to offset the negative effect. 
The shape of these functions is determined by the behaviour the components of (25) 
with respect to p . According to (24), output is decreasing in p  and so is the size of the 
output scarcity rent, while the grandfathering scarcity rent is constant in p . Combining (20) 
and (24) we conclude that the cost effect (determined by *ie ) is a decreasing function of p . 
This is due to the ability of the firm to adapt by reducing output (and emissions) and 
increasing abatement. It turns out that the latter effect dominates the former, which gives 
the profit function a convex shape. 
3.3 Stackelberg 
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Assume that firms 1 and 2  are a leader and a follower respectively. In this case, we 
need to impose Assumption 2 to ensure interior solution. 12 
Assumption 2. The price of permits is bounded in the following way: Sd p p   where 
 
2
2
2
S bd rt a cp :
b tr
   .      (27) 
By standard methods, we obtain the equilibrium outputs: 
*
1 2
a c rpx
b
  ,      (28) 
*
2 4
a c rpx
b
  .      (29) 
 From (28) and (29), we conclude that the leader’s output is twice that of the follower. 
Using these expressions we obtain the equilibrium profits in terms of p  and, by 
differentiation, we obtain the effect of the carbon price on profits: 
 
*
*
* *
2 2
i
G
i
x
i
i
i i
SR
SR e
r p dS x rx
dp t

       
,    (30) 
which looks similar to (25) and qualitatively the same effects are present. The 
grandfathering scarcity rent and the abatement effect are identical as in the Cournot model. 
Once again, the output scarcity rent by itself cannot compensate for the cost effect due to a 
higher carbon price. Also, the positive abatement effect is increasing in p , and so the higher 
the carbon price the more the firms can benefit by doing abatement to adapt themselves to 
the market conditions. 
 As a difference from the Cournot case, the output scarcity rent that accrues to each 
firm represents a larger proportion of its own output ( 2r  instead of 3r ). Another 
                                                 
12 In this case, the upper bound is set at the point at which the emissions of the follower become zero, which 
implies that the rest of relevant variables are non-negative. 
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difference is due to the fact that the leader produces twice as much as the follower, and thus, 
it enjoys more output scarcity rents, but its gross emissions are also bigger than the 
follower's. Simple manipulation of (30), together with (28) and (29), gives 
   1 2* * * *1 2 02 8r a c rpr x xdp dp b          ,   (31) 
where the inequality always holds under interior solution. Therefore, a rise in the carbon 
price will always benefit more (or harm less) the follower than the leader. The reason lies 
in the output difference: since the leader produces more than the follower, it also pollutes 
more and its cost is more sensitive to the carbon price. The impact of p  on both firms’ 
profit is summarised in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.  *1 p  and  *2 p  are strictly convex functions of p  with a global  
minimum at 1ˆ Sp  and 2ˆ Sp  respectively, with 2 1ˆ ˆS Sd p p  . 
 According to Proposition 2, the minima of the profit functions are ordered such that 
2 1ˆ ˆp p ; i.e., the follower reaches a minimum for a lower price than the leader. Hence, if 
2ˆp p  both firms are situated in the decreasing part of their profit functions (and so they 
would prefer that the price decreases). If, instead, 2 1ˆ ˆp p p  , the follower is situated in 
the increasing part (and so will benefit from a price increase), whereas the leader is still in 
the decreasing part (and therefore will still prefer the price to decrease). So, one important 
novelty of the Stackelberg model with respect to Cournot is the fact that both firms can have 
different interests regarding the evolution of p . 
 
4. Firms’ agreement on tougher policies 
It is a common belief that firms will generally oppose tougher environmental policies 
as they will make them worse off. In practice, this opposition can be one of the main hurdles 
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for policy makers (see, e.g. Switzer, 1997). But, as discussed in the introduction, some 
authors have shown that this is not always the case as, under some circumstances, a tougher 
policy could increase, rather than decrease, firms’ profits. Our results point in the same 
direction due to the existence of scarcity rents. In this section we explore the question of 
how the existence of scarcity rents can make the firms willing to accept a tougher climate 
policy. We pay particular attention to the case in which both firms are simultaneously 
willing to accept a higher carbon price as this seems the most favourable situation for policy 
makers to introduce a tougher carbon policy. We call the parameter range in which this 
event takes place the “agreement region”. 
To get sharper results about this question we focus on the separable case introduced 
in Section 3, although the qualitative insights we obtain could be extended to a more general 
setting. We have shown that, both in the Cournot and the Stackelberg cases, for each firm 
there is a threshold below which it prefers the carbon price to decrease and above which it 
prefers an increase. The comparison of these thresholds is crucial to determine the firms’ 
willingness to accept a tougher policy. 
 
4.1 Cournot vs. Stackelberg 
In the Cournot model, according to Proposition 1, the threshold value is ˆ Cp , which 
splits the range of possible values for p  into two non-empty regions, that we call C-I:=
ˆ[ , )Cd p  and C-II:= ˆ( , ]C Cp p . The profit of both firms is decreasing in p  in the first region 
and increasing in the second. Therefore, the agreement region in this case is C-II. 
Things are somewhat different in the Stackelberg case. From Proposition 2, we 
know 2 1ˆ ˆS Sp p , which means that the follower reaches the threshold value for a lower 
value of p  than the leader does. As it is shown in Figure 1, this can give rise to three 
different regions. In region S-I:= 2ˆ[ , )Sd p , the profit of both firms is decreasing in p .  
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In region S-II:= 2 1ˆ ˆ( , )S Sp p , the profit of the leader is still decreasing while the follower’s is 
increasing. Finally, in region S-III:= 1 1ˆ( , ]S Sp p  the profit of both firms is increasing in p . 
So, the agreement region is S-III. Proposition 3 compares the relevant thresholds for both 
models. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Equilibrium profits as a function of p in the Stackelberg model 
 
Proposition 3. The critical values of the carbon price in the Cournot and the Stackelberg 
model are ordered in the following way: 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆS C S S Cp p p p p    . 
According to Proposition 3, 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆS C Sp p p  , which means that a Cournot firm 
reaches the threshold value later (for a higher price) than a Stackelberg follower but sooner 
than a Stackelberg leader. Moreover, the last three inequalities in Proposition 3 imply that 
region S-III is strictly contained in region C-II, i.e., the agreement region is larger under 
Cournot than under Stackelberg competition. We conclude that under a leader-follower 
relationship it is less likely than in a symmetric setting that both firms are simultaneously 
willing to accept a higher carbon price. 
 *1 p
 *2 p
d
*
i
p
Reg. S‐I
1ˆ Sp2ˆ Sp
Reg. S‐II Reg. S‐III
Sp
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Whatever the market structure, one natural question is how large the agreement 
region is, or, in other words, how likely it is to fall within this region. Consider the 
Stackelberg case. Region S-III is delimited by two threshold values for p . First, 1ˆ Sp , which 
is the price above which it is profitable, not only for the follower, but also for the leader to 
face a higher price. The second threshold is the upper bound, Sp , which is the highest value 
of the price compatible with an interior solution. The size of region III is thus given by the 
difference between these two thresholds, which can be computed as 
1 2
4ˆ 2
S S btSp p
b tr
   ,      (32) 
and so the size of region S-III depends positively on the number of free permits received by 
the firms, as well as the slope of the demand curve, b , and the abatement cost parameter t
, whereas it depends negatively on the emissions intensity parameter, r .  
In the next subsection we focus on the role of grandfathering. 
 
4.2 The role of grandfathering13 
Consider first the Cournot model. For convenience, we define the following 
threshold: 
 2: 9C
r a c dr
S
b
  . 
 
Proposition 4. In the Cournot model, under Assumption 1, the following results hold: 
a) As S  increases, ˆ Cp  decreases, which implies that the size of region C-I decreases 
and that of region C-II increases.  
                                                 
13 In the case of carbon tax, a similar discussion can made be around a tax exemption, but the grandfathering 
story seems more relevant in practice as there is currently a tendency to move from grandfathering to 
auctioning (e.g. in the EU ETS). 
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b) For any value CS S  , region C-I disappears. 
c) The size of region C-II is strictly positive for 0S  . 
Increasing the number of free permits, S , shifts the lower bound of region C-II to 
the left while the upper bound price remains the same. Therefore, region C-I shrinks and 
region C-II gets larger, which implies that the chances for agreement increase. Moreover, 
Proposition 4 shows that region C-I disappears if S  is large enough. The main consequence 
is that the more free permits the firms own, the more likely they are to be willing that the 
carbon price increases. The reason is that the existence of free permits makes permit 
purchasing less costly. Moreover, if S  is large enough it opens the way for obtaining 
positive revenues by selling some permits. Nevertheless, result c) in the proposition implies 
that, even without grandfathering, there is a positive range such that both firms prefer the 
carbon price to increase. 
We now perform a similar exercise for the Stackelberg case. Define the following 
threshold value for S : 
 : 8S
r a c dr
S
b
  .     (33) 
Lemma 1. In the Stackelberg model, under Assumption 2, the following results hold: 
a) If 0 S S   , then 2 1ˆ ˆ Sd p p p   . 
b) If 2S S S   , then 2 1ˆ ˆ Sp d p p   . 
c) If 2S S  , then 2 1ˆ ˆ Sp p d p   .  
d) If 0S  ,  then 2 1ˆ ˆ Sd p p p   . 
Proposition 5. In the Stackelberg model, under Assumption 2, the following results hold: 
a) If 0 SS S   , regions S-I, S-II and S-III are non-empty.  
b) If 2S SS S S   , region I disappears and region II is delimited by 1ˆ Sd p p  . 
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c) If 2 SS S  , regions I and II disappear and region III is defined by the entire feasible 
range, [ , ]Sd p . 
d) If 0S  , region S-III disappears.  
 The consequences of Lemma 1 and Proposition 5 are the following. The threshold 
values 1ˆ Sp  and 2ˆ Sp  decrease with S , which implies that, for each firm, there is a wider range 
such that its profit is increasing in p . This renders a similar conclusion as in the Cournot 
model: the chances of agreement increase with grandfathering. If the initial allocation is 
large enough, region I disappears, which implies that the follower is always interested in 
increasing p  and, if it is even larger, both regions I and II disappear, which implies that 
both the leader and the follower are always willing to accept a higher carbon price. This is 
the most favourable case for making the carbon policy tougher. 
There is an important qualitative difference with respect to the Cournot model: 
without grandfathering (i.e., 0S  ) the size of the agreement region decreases to the extent 
that it disappears because a price increase is never profitable for the leader although it can 
be for the follower. The policy implication is that, if the output market is characterised by 
Stackelberg competition and there is no grandfathering, it is unlikely that the firms are 
willing to agree on a more stringent policy. 
 
4.3. Parameter asymmetries in. the Stackelberg model 
In the previous subsections we have assumed that both firms are fully symmetric in 
terms of their cost functions and the initial allocation they receive. In the Cournot case, 
moreover, they are also symmetric regarding their role in the market. In the Stackelberg 
model, although they are symmetric in terms of the parameters there is an asymmetry in 
their role as one acts as a leader and the other as a follower. 
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As a sensitivity analysis, in this subsection we consider the possibility that firms are 
asymmetric in terms of cost and/or initial permit endowment. In the Cournot case, since we 
start from a fully symmetric situation, it is rather straightforward to conclude that 
introducing any asymmetry between the firms will make their interests diverge and the 
chances for agreements will decrease. So, we focus on the Stackelberg case, in which the 
results are less obvious as we start from a situation that is already asymmetric in nature. 
We denote the production cost of firm i  as i ic x , where ic  is a firm-specific unit cost 
parameter. Analogously, firm i’s abatement cost function is given by: 
   i i i i i iAC q q d t q  , 1,2i  .   (34) 
Each firm receives an initial free endowment of permits, Si, which is not necessarily 
constant across firms. Proceeding as in the basic case, we obtain the optimal amounts of 
emissions, abatement and purchase of permits for each firm in the emissions stage:14 
 * , 2ii i ii
d pe x p rx
t
  ,    (35) 
       * 2 ii i
p dq p
t
 ,     (36) 
 * , 2 ii i i i
p dy x p rx S
t
   ,    (37) 
and, moving on to the output stage, we can compute the equilibrium levels of output: 
* 2 1
1
2
2
a c c rpx
b
   ,     (38) 
* 1 2
2
2 3
4
a c c rpx
b
   .     (39) 
                                                 
14 Unlike the other parameters, we assume that the emissions intensity parameter, r, is common to both firms; 
i.e., 1 2r r r  . There are two reasons for this simplification. First, the sensitivity analysis results related to 
these parameters are unclear and so we do not gain any valuable insight by exploring them. Second, the sign 
of some equilibrium values for some of the key variables are affected by the terms 1 22r r  and/or 1 23 2r r  and 
this fact forces us to keep the asymmetry between these parameters bounded so as to avoid meaningless results. 
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To investigate the likelihood of agreement, we proceed by analysing the effect of 
different parameters on the size of region S-III. Due to the larger number of parameters, by 
choosing the right combination of them we could generate almost any imaginable case. 
Hence, we need to delimit the range of possibilities so as to avoid meaningless results. For 
this reason, we introduce the following assumptions: 
Assumption 3: 21 2, Sd d p p   ,   where 2Sp   is the value of p  such that *2 0e  . 
Assumption 4: The parameters of the model are such that * *1 2e e . 
Assumption 5: The parameters of the model are such that 2 1ˆ ˆS Sp p . 
Apart from guaranteeing interior solution, these assumptions ensure that the leader 
will still be the one who produces a larger amount of output and emissions. Hence, the 
follower will still be the one who finds it profitable to pollute zero for a lower value of p  
and such a value determines the upper bound for the interval that is compatible with an 
interior solution, 2Sp   (where “ 2S  ” stands for “Stackelberg, case 2”). Accordingly, it is 
easier for the follower than it is for the leader to benefit from a price increase. 
Under these assumptions, region S-III is still delimited by the leader’s critical price, 
call it 21ˆ Sp  , and the upper bound 2Sp   and hence its size increases if 2Sp   increases and/or 
2
1ˆ Sp   decreases. Proposition 6 summarises how the size of this region depends on the 
parameters of the model and Table 1 presents a taxonomy of all the relevant effects. 
 
 
Proposition 6. In the Stackelberg case, under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the size of region S-
III increases in the following cases: 
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a) If the leader’s marginal production cost, 1c , increases or the follower’s marginal 
production cost, 2c , decreases. 
b) If the parameter of the linear term in the abatement cost function decreases for the leader 
( 1d ) or increases for the follower ( 2d ).  
c) If the parameter of the quadratic term in the leader’s abatement cost function, 1t , 
decreases (provided the number of free permits is moderate) or the equivalent follower’s 
parameter, 2t , increases.  
d) If the number of free permits received by the leader, 1S , increases, regardless of the free 
permits received by the follower .  
Effects on 
Thresholds 
Changes in model parameters  
c1 c2 d1 d2 t1 t2 S1 S2 
2Sp   + - 0 + 0 + 0 0 
2
1ˆ Sp   - + + 0 + (*) 0 - 0 
 2 21ˆS Sp p    + - - + - (*) + + 0 
Table 1. Summary of sensitivity analysis results. 
                             (*) For a moderate value of S1. 
 
Increasing the leader’s production cost or reducing the follower’s production cost 
tends to erode the leader’s advantage with respect to the follower in the output market, 
which has the effect of making the firms more symmetric in a certain sense. The more 
symmetric the firms are, the more aligned their interests will be and hence it is more likely 
that they agree. Increasing 1c  has a twofold effect. On the one hand, Sp  grows because the 
follower’s output increases, which makes it less likely for firm 2 to decide not to emit at all 
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(in other words, the range of prices under which there is an interior solution widens). On the 
other hand, 1ˆ Sp  decreases as, due to the higher cost, firm 1 tends to produce less and to emit 
less and hence its total cost will be less sensitive to an increase in the price of permits. Both 
of these effects tend to enlarge the agreement region. Just the opposite occurs when 2c  
increases. Firm 1 tends to produce more and pollute more and hence its cost becomes more 
sensitive to an increase in the price of permits (which increases the value of 1ˆ Sp ), whereas 
the follower tends to produce less and to reach the point where it finds it profitable to stop 
polluting sooner ( Sp  decreases), which reduces the size of the agreement region. 
The abatement cost parameters ( id  and it ) are only relevant for the own firm, but 
not for its rival. Both 2d  and 2t  are irrelevant in determining the value of 1ˆ Sp . However, 
increasing either of them enlarges the relevant feasible range because the follower’s 
abatement cost increase, which makes it less likely to reach the point where it pollutes zero. 
The corresponding parameters for firm 1 are immaterial in determining the value of Sp , 
their only relevant effect being on 1pˆ . Assuming a moderate value of the leader’s initial 
endowment of permits, any increase in 1d  and 1t  makes the leader’s abatement cost higher, 
which makes firm 1 become more sensitive to increases in the price of permits. 
Finally, the initial allocation of permits is irrelevant for the upper bound Sp , as it 
represents simply a fixed term in the cost (and the profit) function and so the optimal 
decisions are not affected. The value of a firm’s profits is affected by its own endowment 
(not the rival’s) and hence only 1S  is relevant in determining the size of region S-III. When 
the leader’s free endowment increases, its cost becomes less sensitive to an increase in the 
price of permits and it will hence be more receptive to the idea of facing a higher carbon 
price. 
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5. Conclusions and discussion 
We have studied the creation of scarcity rents for oligopolistic firms due to the 
existence of a carbon price and, more specifically, how these rents respond to a price 
increase. Along with a higher compliance cost, a carbon price increase can generate scarcity 
rents in two ways: firstly, by restricting output and pushing up its price, and secondly, when 
the firms are endowed with an initial allocation (in the form of grandfathering or a tax 
exemption), a higher carbon price makes such an allocation more valuable. 
We have demonstrated that the extent to which so-called output scarcity rents can 
be obtained by a specific firm increases with the elasticity of its rival's output to the carbon 
price. The reason is that the effect of own output variation cannot be profitable in 
equilibrium. 
A leadership position tends, ceteris paribus, to make a firm produce more, so its cost 
becomes more sensitive to a carbon price increase. As a consequence, a leader is less prone 
to be willing to face a higher price and thus to accept a tougher carbon policy. Therefore, if 
the firms are otherwise symmetric, the existence of a leader-follower relationship makes it 
more difficult to reach a consensus on a more stringent policy. In a specific example we 
have shown that the agreement region can shrink to such an extent that it can disappear. 
Another policy implication is that exempting a part of total emissions (e.g. by means 
of grandfathering) seems a crucial device to make firms willing to accept a tougher carbon 
policy. In the case of Stackelberg competition (with otherwise symmetric firms) this effect 
may be particularly important, as the existence of grandfathering is actually a necessary 
condition for an agreement region to exist. The greater the amount of exempt emissions 
(particularly for firms that enjoy market power) the more willing firms will be and, in the 
case of a Stackelberg setting, it is the leader’s initial allocation that matters. The European 
Union is reducing the use of grandfathering and increasing the use of auctioning to distribute 
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emission permits.15 One of the hurdles that this policy change may find is the opposition of 
firms. 
Firms’ receptiveness to tougher policies appears to be very sensitive to the cost 
asymmetries between them. In general terms, the more asymmetric the firms are, the more 
difficult it is to reach a consensus. 
 To keep our analysis simple and intuitive, we have intentionally kept some 
simplifying assumptions that can merit some discussion. One simplification we have 
adopted is to assume that there are only two firms. In the Appendix we present the extension 
of our analysis to an arbitrary number of firms and show that all the central results are still 
valid. 
Also, in our specific example we have assumed a linear demand. Although this is 
not fundamental for the central messages, it has the implication that output scarcity rent by 
itself cannot be high enough to fully compensate the cost effect of a higher carbon price. 
Under an iso-elastic demand the cost pass-through can be more than complete and the output 
scarcity rent could outweigh the increase in compliance costs. 
 To focus on the leader-follower competition, in the Stackelberg model we have initially 
kept the firms otherwise symmetric. Even in our sensitivity analysis (Subsection 4.3) we 
have kept a certain degree of symmetry to ensure that the order of the relevant thresholds is 
not altered. The reason is that, by changing the parameters of the model in the right direction, 
we could generate almost any imaginable situation. Specifically, we have assumed that the 
emission intensity is constant across firms. Without this assumption it is not necessarily true 
that the leader’s cost is more sensitive to the carbon price than the follower’s. 
  Some authors have pointed out the possibility that some firms enjoying market 
power could manipulate the carbon price up. See, among others, Misiolek and Elder (1989), 
                                                 
15 The 2008 revised European Emission Trading Directive established the mandate that auctioning is to be the 
default method for allocating allowances as a fundamental change for the third trading period, starting in 2013. 
See, e.g. Alvarez and André (2015). 
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Von der Fehr (1993), Sartzetakis (1997, 2004), Hintermann (2011, 2015) or Ehrhart et al. 
(2008). We have not explicitly addressed this possibility as we have taken the carbon price 
as exogenous whereas in most of the literature on price manipulation market power is 
assumed in the permit market.16 Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret our results in terms 
of generation of incentives for price manipulation.17 In this respect, our results show that 
the findings by, e.g. Hintermann (2011, 2015) are somewhat robust to the choice of 
competitive setting. 
 Finally, we have not addressed welfare analysis. One can argue that the generation 
of scarcity rents will make firms better off but it will also make consumers worse off. 
Nevertheless, a fully-fledged welfare analysis would also require a consideration of the 
effect of policy on environmental quality, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The equilibrium value for emissions can be obtained from equations (20) and (24). 
Equating this value to zero we conclude that emissions are positive under Assumption 1: 
     *
2
2 3 2 30 :6 3 2
C
i
tr a c rp b p d tr a c bd
e p p
bt b tr
              (A.1) 
Using equations (23) and (24) together with the inverse demand function yields the 
following expression for the equilibrium profit: 
     
2 2
* 4 9 36
36i
t a c rp b p d bptS
p
bt
      , 
which is strictly convex in p  because the second derivative is positive. From the first 
derivative we get the critical price 
 *
2
4 9 18ˆ0 : 9 4
Ci rt a c bd btSp p
p b r t
        .    (A.2) 
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By direct comparison , we conclude 
                                 
2
2 2
6 18 3 2ˆ 03 2 9 4
C C
brt a c dr btS b r t
p p
b r t b r t
       ,  (A.3) 
which is positive under Assumption 1 because all the parentheses are positive. To prove that 
 a c dr   is positive, using (21) and the definition of abatement ( i i iq rx e  ), we 
conclude that, within the relevant range, 
*
* 0ii ex r  . Using the expression for 
*
ix  given in 
(24), we conclude that 0ix   implies a c rp  , and that this inequality, together with 
d p  (Assumption 1), implies .a c dr        QED. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Using (28) and (29) in (20), we obtain the equilibrium values for emissions: 
   2*
1 2
db rt a c p b tr
e
bt
    ,     (A4) 
   2*
2
2 2
4
bd tr a c p b tr
e
bt
    ,     (A5) 
By direct comparison we conclude that under Assumption 2, equilibrium emissions 
are nonnegative, 
 * *
1 2 2
20 : 2
S bd rt a ce e p p
b tr
       .     (A6) 
and following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2, output must also be 
nonnegative.  Using the equilibrium values of output and emissions, together with the 
expression of the inverse demand and the cost function (19) we obtain the equilibrium 
profits of both firms: 
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         
         
2 2
* * * * * *
1 1 2 1 1 1
2 2
* * * * * *
2 1 2 2 2 2
2 8, ,8
4 16, .16
t a c pr b p d btpS
p P x x x TC x p
bt
t a c pr b p d btpS
p P x x x TC x p
bt
        
        
 
The second derivative reveals that these functions are strictly convex. Differentiating 
them with respect to p, we conclude that they have respective minima at 
   
   
*
1 1 2
*
2 2 2
2 4ˆmin ,2
4 8ˆmin ,4
S
p
S
p
rt a c bd btS
Arg p p
b tr
rt a c bd btS
Arg p p
b tr
     
     
 
and it follows straightforwardly that both 1ˆ Sp  and 2ˆ Sp  depend negatively on S . 
Regarding the order of the thresholds, by direct comparison we conclude that 
 1 2ˆ ˆ 2 2 0S Sp p brt a c dr rSt      ; however, we have already proved 0a c dr    in 
Proposition 1, which ensures that 1 2ˆ ˆS Sp p . Moreover, using (A6) we also conclude that 
1 12
4ˆ ˆ2
S S SbtSp p p
b tr
   . Hence, we have that 2 1ˆ ˆ
S S Sp p p  .   QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
To prove the proposition it is enough to compare the corresponding expressions, 
compute the difference and check the sign. 
 
  
2 2
1 2 2
2ˆ ˆ 02 9 4
S C brt a c dr br t Sp p
b r t b r t
      , 
 
  
2 2
2 2 2
7 14ˆ ˆ 09 4 4
C S brt a c dr br t Sp p
b r t b r t
      , 
 
  2 2 03 2 2C S
rbt a c dr
p p
b r t b r t
     .         QED 
            
Proof of Proposition 4 
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The first part of the proposition results from deriving the expression for ˆ Cp  given 
in (A.2) with respect to S . To prove the second part note that Region I disappears when 
ˆ Cd p , and using the expression for ˆ Cp : 
   
2
4 9 18 2ˆ :9 4 9
C rt a c bd btS r a c drp d d S S
b r t b
         
 . 
The third part follows immediately from (A.3).    QED 
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Proof of Lemma 1 
From Proposition 2 we know 2 1ˆ ˆS S Sp p p  . To determine the relative position of 
d , first note that Assumption 2 implies Sd p  and hence we only have to check whether 
d  is below 2ˆ Sp , in the interval  2 1ˆ ˆ,S Sp p  or in the interval  1ˆ ,S Sp p . By direct comparison, 
we conclude the following, which prove statements b) and c): 
 
1ˆ 24
S r a c drp d S S
b
      ,    (A7) 
 
2ˆ 8
S r a c rdp d S S
b
      ,    (A8) 
To prove statement d) note that 1ˆ Sp p  when 0S  .   QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Statement a) follows from a similar reasoning to that used in the proof of Proposition 
4. Statements b), c) and d) follow straightforwardly from the corresponding statements in 
Lemma 1.         QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Using (38) and (39) in (35), we obtain the equilibrium values for emissions: 
     1 1 2 1* *1 1
1
2, 2
b d p t r a c c rp
e x p
bt
     , 
     2 2 1 2* *2 2
2
2 2 3, 4
b d p rt a c c rp
e x p
bt
     . 
 By imposing the non-negativity conditions on the follower’s emissions, we obtain 
the upper bound value for the carbon price, 2Sp  : 
 2 2 2 1* 2
2 2
2
2 3 20 : 2
S bd rt a c ce p p
b r t
        .   (A9) 
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By substitution of the relevant variables in the profit function, we obtain the 
expression for the leader’s profit function in terms of the model parameters:  
     
2 2
2 1 1*
1 1
1
2
8 4
a c c rp p d
p pS
b t
        
Differentiating with respect to p , we obtain 
   * 1 1 1 1 2 11
1
2 4 2
4
b p d bt S rt a c c rp
p bt
        
and, by equating this derivative to zero, we get the minimum value of p  such that the leader 
finds it profitable to push the price up, 21ˆ Sp  : 
 * 1 2 1 1 1 1 21
12
1
2 2 4 ˆ0 : .2
Srt a c c bd bt Sp p
p r t b
           (A10) 
By direct differentiation of the values of 2Sp   and 21ˆ Sp  , we obtain the results in the 
proposition: 
2
2
2
1 2
2 0 ;2
S rtp
c b r t
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2
1 1
1 1
ˆ 2 0 ;2
Sp rt
c b rt
       
2
2
2
2 2
3 0 ;2
S rtp
c b r t
       
2
1 1
2 1
ˆ 0 ;2
Sp rt
c b rt
        
2
1
0 ;
Sp
d
      
2
1
1 1
ˆ 2 0 ;2
Sp b
d b rt
        
2
2
2 2
2 0 ;2
Sp b
d b r t
      
2
1
2
ˆ 0 ;
Sp
d
   
2 2
1 2
0 ;
S Sp p
S S
      
1 1
1 1
ˆ 4 0 ;2
p bt
S b rt
      
2
1
2
ˆ 0 ;
Sp
S
   
 41
   22 2 1 1 1 2 1 11
12
1 1
2 2 8 2ˆ 0 ;42
S br a c c d r b S r a c c d rp S
t br t b
              
 
 
 
2
2 1 2
222 2
2 3 2 0,
2
S br a c c rdp
t b r t
         
where, in an interior solution, the numerator of the last expression must be positive for the 
follower’s output to be positive.       QED. 
 
Extension of the linear separable case with N firms 
In the second stage, the emissions of a firm still depend only on the carbon price and 
the output of that firm, as in (20), and hence the minimized cost function is still given by 
(23). Moving on to the output stage, the inverse demand function can be written as 
i j
j i
P a bX a bx b x

       
 In the COURNOT version, each firm maximizes its own output taking the other 
firms’ as given, which results in the following reaction function for firm i: 
2
j
j i
i
a c pr b x
x
b

  


 
 Solving the system of equations given by the N reaction functions, we obtain the 
equilibrium output and the output price: 
 1i
a c prx
b N
    i=1,…,N 
 
1
a N c pr
P
N
    
 Emissions turn out to be 
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    
 
22 2 1
2 1i
tr a c tr p b N d p
e
bt N
       
and then, to ensure that abatement and emissions (and hence output) are nonnegative, we 
need to impose Cd p p  , where 
   
 2
2 1
2 1
C tr a c N bdp :
tr N b
      
which is the relevant version of Assumption 1. 
Using the equilibrium expressions, the profit of an arbitrary firm, i, can be written 
as 
          
2 2 2 2
*
2
4 1 4 1
4 1i
t a c rp b N p d N bptS
p
N bt
          
which is strictly convex in p and reaches a minimum at 
     
 
2
22
4 1 2ˆ : 4 1
C tr a c b N d tSp
tr b N
       
where we have ˆ C Cd p p   and then Proposition 1 holds with the only difference that ˆ Cp  
depends now on N . 
In the STACKELBERG version, assuming that firm 1 is a leader and firms i=2,…, 
N are followers, we can write the reaction function of each of the followers as 
1
1,
2
j
j i
i
a c pr b x x
x
b

      

 
and the aggregate output of the N-1 followers can be written as 
       11 11F i N a c pr N xx N x bN N
        
 Plugging this expression into the leader’s profit function and solving the leader’s 
first order condition, we get the leader’s output: 
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*
1 2
a c prx
b
  , 
which is exactly the same amount that the leader produces in the N=2 case. And using the 
reaction function, we get the followers’ output: 
* 2,...,2i
a c prx i N
bN
   . 
 Using these expressions, we can compute equilibrium emissions and, to ensure 
interior solution, we need to impose Sd p p   where 
 
2
S Nbd rt a cp :
Nb tr
    
which is the relevant version of Assumption 2. 
The leader’s and the followers’ profits are given by 
     
2 2
*
1
4
4
t a c rp bN p d bNptS
p
bNt
       
     
2 22 2
*
2
4
4i
t a c rp bN p d bptSN
p
btN
       
and it’s straightforward to conclude that Proposition 2 still holds with  
   
   
*
1 1 2
2 2
*
2 2
2ˆmin ,
2ˆmin , i 2,..., N
S
p
S
i ip
rt a c Nbd NbtS
Arg p p
Nb tr
rt a c N bd N btS
Arg p p
N b tr
     
     
 
with 1ˆ ˆS Sid p p  . 
 Comparing the critical values we also conclude 1ˆ ˆ ˆS C S S Cip p p p p     for 
i=1,…,N, and so Proposition 3 also holds. Proposition 4 can be verified in the same way. 
